Attitudes towards a regional military force are of paramount importance when exploring public support for regional integration. Until now, however, scholarly research has not considered the influence of attitudes towards a regional military mechanism in the subSaharan African context. Using Afrobarometer data, we demonstrate that military concerns are vital when exploring Tanzanian attitudes towards the proposed political federation of the East African Community (EAC), the East African Federation (EAF). More specifically, opposition to military cooperation strongly influences Tanzanian scepticism of the EAF. This finding is highly relevant given that referendums in the participating member states must be passed to facilitate political integration. Heightened opposition towards military cooperation raises the possibility of the public rejecting a politically integrated EAC. This poses a potential obstacle to the implementation of joint security policies and crucial mechanisms to provide a more stable region at large. We account for alternative explanations of Tanzanian opinion formation and reflect on the strength of military-orientated concerns for investigating public support for the East African project specifically and regional integration in subSaharan Africa more widely.
Introduction
Attitudes towards a regional military force are of paramount importance when exploring public support for regional integration. In the European context (where theories of opinion formation have been generated), scepticism of a militarised European Union (EU) has created opposition to 'further' integration processes, calling into question the future of the EU project in its entirety. 1 Instability and conflicts in the East African region have meant that security concerns are of central importance to the regional integration efforts of the dominant regional grouping of the area: the East African Community (EAC). Until now, however, scholarly research has not considered the influence of attitudes towards a regional military force in the East African (or wider sub-Saharan African) area. We suggest that military concerns are of paramount importance when exploring public support for the proposed political federation of the EAC, the East African Federation (EAF), and that these concerns are highly politically relevant given that referendums in the participating states must be passed to facilitate such integration. 2 We focus on public opinion in Tanzania, an EAC partner state for which we have comprehensive data to test military-orientated interpretations of integration attitudes. Our key empirical finding relates to the importance of the military aspects of regional integration.
Tanzanian scepticism of the EAF is strongly driven by opposition to military co-operation.
This raises the possibility, in the context of any upcoming referendum, that scepticism of militarism will drive a No vote, analogous to the influence of the issue of military neutrality on Irish rejections of the Nice and Lisbon Treaty referendums and Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty. 3 These rejections -for a time at least -derailed the EU integration process and led to the generation of specific military-related protocols/opt-outs to assuage citizens' concerns and facilitate the successful re-running of the referendums. 4 This article is organised as follows. Following a brief overview of the EAC's economic, security and political objectives, we specify our hypotheses, describe the data used to test the hypotheses (Afrobarometer data from Tanzania, 2008 and 2012) and report our findings. In the discussion section we reflect upon the implications of our findings regarding Tanzanian attitudes for our understanding of the determinants of citizen support for (and opposition to) the EAF more generally. We underline possible referendum-related obstacles to the achievement of full political integration. We also reflect upon the transferability across the context of EU-inspired interpretations of opinion formation: in particular, military concerns are likely to be of relevance in African regional projects more widely because insecurity and conflict are problems which are rife in all of the continent's regions.
Background: the East African Community
Regional unity in East Africa began in the early 20 th century through the creation of a Customs Collection Centre, an East African Currency Board and Court of Appeal. 5 The EAC, consisting of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, was established in 1967 and was arguably the most sophisticated regional cooperative arrangement in the less developed world at this time.
However, in the face of national priorities, the EAC was disbanded in 1977. 6 From the mid- by an EAC defence protocol under which joint initiatives with regards to the region's insecurity are to continue. Increasing levels of violence and insurgence in Burundi -and the mass exodus of refugees from the on-going leadership crisis there -highlight the necessity of tackling a marred regional security environment through a joint security mechanism. Regional security matters gained priority in the most recent Heads of State summit (2015), as chaired by Tanzania's President, Jayaka Kikwete; however, the extent to which leaders will expedite the implementation of relevant counter measures remains to be seen. 9 The proposed launch of the East African Political Federation in January 2010 was not achieved and there remains a lack of clarity as to the exact framework which political federation might take. 10 Nonetheless, there is a general consensus among partners regarding the mechanism through which political federation is to be achieved: public mobilisation. In the (Wako) Committee -established to consider how EAC integration may be fast-tracked -the governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania emphasise the need to facilitate citizens in learning about, and being engaged in, the integration process; they concluded that 'a public referendum in the three partner states would appear the most natural policy choice…to create a sustainable political federation'. 11 Referendums in the East African region have predominantly been used as a mechanism to legitimise nation-state powers; 12 however, elite and civil society demand for a referendum on the issue of an EAF cannot continue to be overlooked. Wider citizen involvement and support is perceived as fundamental to a regional integration project that is more successful than the previous (1977) failure. 13 Given the relevance of citizen support for the legitimacy of the EAF, the prospect of a referendum on the matter is imminent; a referendum that will plausibly be driven in significant part by citizen views of the integration process.
The re-invigorated EAC thus vastly diverges from the original Community on the basis of its democratic foundations. The formation and processes of the original Community were elite driven; private stakeholders and civil society were not involved in the process. (and the implementation of economic, security and political initiatives alike), a furtherance of the 'coalition of the willing' is debateable. 20 In sharp contrast to elite narratives on EAC progression, this paper is concerned with citizen standpoints on greater integration in the region. Both local and international elite influences are certainly integral to the development of the EAC, but lacking citizen support could pose an obstacle for policy makers to deliver any such direction, hence key interest in citizen attitude formation on the matter. A recent survey suggests that 85% of Tanzanians approve (or strongly approve) of greater integration with Kenya and Uganda, while 62% further support integration measures with Burundi and Rwanda. 21 Our aim is to find out if the idea of a militarised EAC explains Tanzanian support for -or scepticism of -political integration in East Africa. We further aim to discuss the real world important implications of our findings for a referendum, which would either legitimise or prohibit further integration in the region.
Hypotheses: explaining support (and opposition) for East African Federation
Using EU-based literature on opinion formation as our departure point, we outline our key expectation relating to the role of attitudes towards a joint military force in explaining support for the political federation of East Africa. The EAC policy domain encompasses economic, security, social and political objectives at its core, therefore it is also useful to generate alternative explanations of opinion formation: we specify factors that have been crucial in a developed (EU) context (economics, identity and cognitive mobilisation), and an additional factor which we derive from the East African integration case: perceptions of previous integration failures.
Security-related determinants
Opposition to military co-operation has been a source of scepticism in EU member states: without the generation of official protocols and clarifications to overcome antipathy to a militaristic EU, the continuation of European integration would have been subject to question. clarifications were needed to unambiguously state Ireland's non-commitment to an EU common defence, to neutralise the military issue, and to facilitate citizens' subsequent approval of the treaty in a second referendum. 23 Similarly, in a non-EU context (North-East Asia), scholars have highlighted the role of security related factors. In two separate analyses of South
Korean support for North East Asian integration, perceptions of threat from neighbouring countries (China, Japan and North Korea) were found to be paramount. 24 We expect that opposition towards a regional security and defence framework will similarly have paramount importance in the East African context. The prevalence of conflict, terrorist and rebel group action and citizen dislocation in East Africa indicates that matters of security are likely to be at the forefront of voter minds. Regional integration is perceived as a vital method to overcome instability and provide a peaceful environment. In this regard, if a citizen is in favour of a regional response to security problems, i.e. the formation of a joint army, they are likely to support the further integration of the EAC partner states. Conversely, if a citizen perceives a more militarised region as a response that will draw their principality into neighbouring -currently, Burundian -conflict, they are unlikely to support regional integration initiatives and the security-orientated commitments involved. Notably, we do not infer that a majority of citizens oppose or support a more militarised region overall; we present the rationale that those who are more supportive -relative to those who are more opposed -of a militarised East African region are likely to perceive the EAF more positively.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Citizens who approve a joint military force in East Africa
support East African political integration.
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Alternative explanations
We draw on three additional theories of opinion formation, which have gained prominence in the EU context and which will plausibly account for any further variation in individual-level support for the EAF. Aligned to the economic endeavour of most European integration efforts, the first indicates the importance of economic determinants in explaining public support. Gabel and Palmer suggest that European integration differentially affects citizens depending on their level of 'human capital'. 26 Citizens with high levels of human capital -who are highly educated and skilled -are equipped to compete successfully in an expanded market with heightened investment opportunities. They are well placed to avail of the market opportunities that follow from the integration process and are able to adapt to economic adjustments that occur. In contrast, those with relatively low levels of education and skills are likely to be less capable of taking advantage of such opportunities and are thus more likely to be threatened by, and be vulnerable to, increased competition. In East Africa, over the past two decades there has been a decline in the dominance of traditional/subsistence agriculture and a rise in skills-based industries and service sectors, 27 leading to the generation of considerable variation in the levels of human capital that citizens have. 28 While there remains a vast difference between Europe and East Africa in terms of occupational structure -and human capital levels are, overall, much lower in East Africa than in the EU -we expect that egocentric economic reasoning has similar implications for understanding attitudes to regional integration in both contexts:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Citizens in East Africa with high human capital levels support East African political integration.
The processes of economic and political integration are closely aligned in the EAC context and the relationship between the two may usefully be viewed either as 'linear' or 'concurrent'. 'Linear' models of integration (including, according to Mattli, the EU and the EAC) are characterised by a step-wise process: political unification -the ultimate end goalfollows on from economic integration (for example, free movement of labour, a common market, customs union and monetary union). 29 As a result of the economic and political failure of the 'old' EAC, the objective of political integration in the current EAC framework is very closely linked to economic integration. 30 The inter-governmental Wako Committee (referred to earlier) has advised an 'overlapping' approach whereby parallel activities of economic stages of integration should be merged to achieve political federation within a shorter period, and it was argued that 'the establishment of the Political Federation should not wait for all expectations of the EAC integration to be realised'. 31 Thus, if citizens do not support economic integration, it is unlikely that they will support further (political) integration. Conversely, if economic integration is supported, this is likely to spill over, making citizens much more amenable to further integration. In order to understand this conditionality, some scholars have focused on how national identity relative to other identities influences attitudes to supra-national authority. For example,
Hooghe and Marks have distinguished people with an 'exclusive' national identity from those with an 'inclusive' national identity, since the latter do not perceive of themselves in terms of one single territorial identity and therefore are more likely to be favourable towards Europe:
'Country first, but Europe too'. 34 Other scholars have focused on the comparison between national and sub-national identity and how this comparison shapes views on regional integration. For example, stronger EU support has been found in peripheral UK regions (Wales and Scotland) since the EU is perceived as a means to assert regional identity distinctiveness, particularly when the relationship between the region and nation is perceived as troublesome. 35 Given the importance of sub-national groups in Eastern African -notably tribal/ethnic groups -we focus on the 'national' versus 'sub-national'/'tribal' identity distinction. 36 The distinction is particularly pertinent in Tanzania as it is the only member state to have followed a strong nation-building programme since independence. Arguably, the country's socialist leader, Julius Nyerere, played a vital role in this process: he 'forcefully downplayed the role of ethnic affiliation in public life and instead emphasised a single Tanzanian national identity'. 37 We expect that Tanzanians with a strong sense of national identity -relative to tribal identity -are likely to be sceptical of the EAF since an addition of this supranational layer constitutes a dilution of national sovereignty. 38 Hypothesis 4 (H4): Citizens with a strong sense of national identity, relative to a sub-national tribal/ethnic identity, are sceptical of East African political integration.
Finally, the extent that an individual is aware or knowledgeable about regional integration has had implications for public support in the European context and is likely to be of similar importance in the East African setting. Inglehart used the term 'cognitive mobilisation' to describe the skills necessary to cope with a distant political community (such as the European Community) and argued that those with higher levels of cognitive mobilisation are more likely to absorb information and be familiar with the advantages of regional integration than those with lower cognitive mobilisation levels. 39 Janssen and Gabel established thereafter that those more familiar with the topic of European integration were generally less threatened. 40 In the East African context, concern has been voiced that levels of knowledge and awareness of the EAC are low. For example, an investigation of citizen engagement with the integration process concluded that:
… there remains the fundamental question about how East African citizens can broadly be involved and allowed the space to participate in the EAC integration process…this question has been heightened by what is often described as the lack of knowledge about the EAC amongst the broad masses…this question clearly begs another: whose responsibility is it to educate the citizens? 41 Consistent with this concern, Katera notes that a majority of Tanzanians have negligible knowledge of the EAC: nearly 31% had not heard anything about the Federation; 46% had heard 'a little' or 'some'; only 20% had heard 'a lot'. 42 Debates relating to future referendums on political integration in member states frequently highlight the potentially limiting impact of such low awareness levels. 43 Following scholars of European public opinion, we expect that there will be significant differences between the many citizens with low knowledge of the EAC and the minority of citizens with relatively high knowledge. Those who are at least somewhat familiar with the EAC are more likely to absorb information on the topic and understand how regional integration can benefit domestic social and political circumstances. In contrast, the cognitively 'unmobilised', who are not engaged with EAC initiatives and future prospects, are less likely to comprehend the meaning of community membership and are hence likely to be fearful of, and unsupportive of, the integration process.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Citizens in East Africa with high levels of cognitive mobilisation support East African political integration.
Data and modelling approach
Data from the Abrobarometer survey is used to operationalise and test the specified hypotheses. The Afrobarometer is an independent research project that measures public opinion towards the social, political and economic phenomena in 35 African countries on a repeated basis. 44 National probability samples are used by Afrobarometer to generate samples that are a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age in each country.
Survey items relating to the EAC are available for three countries (Tanzania, Kenya 
Dependent variable
The following survey question is used to measure support of an EAF: Response categories (for both time points) are on a four-point scale from: (1) strongly disapprove (2) disapprove (3) approve (4) strongly approve (don't know responses/missing data are not included). The variables were recalibrated such that they run from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1.
Key explanatory variable
To measure Tanzanian Response options are: (1) strongly disapprove (2) disapprove (3) agree (4) strongly agree.
A single scale was generated from these three variables, representing attitudes to economic integration, and the scale was calibrated to run from 0 to 1 (higher score relates to stronger support). 45 The item tapping a respondent's level of education is used to measure human capital.
The exact question wording is: Tanzanian (5) I feel only Tanzanian (don't know/missing data are not included). 46 The variable was recoded to run from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1.
To measure whether a respondent entered adulthood and had their formative political experiences in the aftermath of the failure of the first EAC but prior to the generation of the new EAC, respondents were coded (1) if they were in adulthood during the dis-integration years (ages 34+), and coded (0) if their adulthood has only involved regional integration experience under the new framework (ages 18-33). (Demographic controls are also included in the analysis: males were coded 1 and females were coded 0. Respondents from a rural background were coded 1 and respondents from an urban background 0.)
Modelling approach
We conduct a number of regression models to test our hypotheses. Our dependent variable (attitudes to political unification) is a semi-continuous scale variable, therefore
Ordinary Least Squares regression is appropriate. The variables used to explain support for EAF may be distinguished in terms of the extent to which they may be endogenous to the dependent variable. The variable used to test our key hypothesis, 'attitudes towards a joint army' is from a battery of questions which explicitly mentions the EAC, therefore, it is likely to be somewhat exogenous to the dependent variable relative to the (more endogenous) variable that we use to test for our 'alternative' explanations of public support. In order to test for the full predictive strength of these latter factors, we first run, at each time point, models with only the relatively exogenous variables (identity, age and education) before including the more endogenous economic variable (which also mentions the EAC in the question wording).
Finally, the variable of crucial interest -attitudes towards a joint army -is entered into a full model with all explanatory variables.
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Results
In the full models containing all predictor variables at both time points (model 3 and model 6) the results concerning our hypothesis of crucial interest are stark. The military factor is by far the strongest predictor of integration attitudes in both 2008 and 2012. The economic integration variable is also a significant predictor at both time points, but of much less substantive importance than the military predictor.
- Table 1 , it emerges that it is attitudes towards military integration which is by far the strongest predictor. 48 The results for our 'alternative' explanations of public support are mixed in the full and partial models. At both time points, across all models, education does not emerge as significant.
There are inconsistencies regarding age (which is significant in 2012 but not 2008), identity (which is significant in 2008 but not 2012), and cognitive mobilisation (which is significant in 2012 but not 2008).
Discussion
Opinion formation: value of military-orientated concerns
The EAC provides a particularly useful case to test (EU-generated) military related determinants of citizen attitudes since in contrast to many regional communities across the globe, which are explicitly based on economic criteria, the EAC considers joint defence and security as crucial to integration progression. Indeed, providing a peaceful and stable environment in the East African region is perceived as crucial to achieving the economic (Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union) and political objectives of the EAC.
There are various international and internal pressures to legitimise the EAC process and involve citizens in an effective way. This analysis of citizen attitude formation provides an evidencebased discussion on the legitimacy of an East African Federation that is driven in significant part by intentions to create a more militarised region.
Tanzania provides a particularly interesting case study to test for military-related 
Opinion formation: value of 'alternative' explanations
It emerges from our analysis that alternative (EU-generated) explanations of public opinion also have strength (albeit limited) in the East African region. In a similar vein to citizens in Europe, Tanzanians evaluate political integration with respect to key aspects of economic integration. The framing of economic and political integration in East Africa as 'overlapping' and 'complementary' seems to have an effect on how citizens envision integration overall. 49 Nonetheless, the effect of the economic factor is dwarfed by the effect of military concerns. Further, the findings for identity and cognitive mobilisation are mixed and no significant relationship emerges between educational qualifications and support for the EAF, suggesting that the economic consequences of regional integration in East Africa are yet to filter down and be 'felt' by ordinary African citizens.
In addition to testing EU generated opinion formation theories, the results of this paper demonstrate that exploring expectations unique to the East African region are revealing. Prior Since the EAC is the most ambitious regional integration project, with referendums on the agenda to achieve full political integration, it has been of primary importance in this paper to explain the determinants of attitudes towards it. However, that member states have commitments to other regional integration arrangements potentially has a direct effect on support for -or scepticism of -the EAC. 
Implications of findings for referendums on East African Federation
This analysis provides an evidence-based discussion regarding the legitimacy of an EAF by outlining the underling motivations of citizen support. Attitudes towards a joint East
African army are likely to play a particularly important role in determining vote behaviour in EAC integration referendums, in Tanzania at least. The manner in which they do so will plausibly depend upon the details of the treaty or agreement that is put to the people. 51 If, for example, strong military co-operation is detailed, the salience of security issues will be raised, potentially leading to significant Tanzanian opposition to the treaty/agreement. In this scenario, a 'two-speed' East African integration process is plausible, in which Tanzania and
Burundi are left behind as the 'coalition of the willing' accelerates further. The EAC elite might find it necessary to issue specific protocols or military opt-outs to assuage the Tanzanian (and perhaps wider) public on the issue of a joint military force. If the East African elite fail to provide a referendum in the short-term, this analysis highlights the reality that EAF legitimacy can be withdrawn on the basis of underlying military concerns, potentially inhibiting the longterm success of the integration project overall.
An additional factor to consider includes the role of second-order national elections.
East African referendums could arguably be used as a vehicle for expressing citizen satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the domestic government and thus referendums will not approximate high quality deliberative events. 52 In the EU context, voter emotions have been demonstrated to substantively influence vote choice: relative to anxious voters, angry voters rely more on second-order issues (domestic politics) when evaluating the EU. 53 If emotions of fear and anxiety are high among an East African electorate -a likely impact of instability in the region -citizen engagement with the specific implications of the EAC will arguably be prevalent. In this instance, campaigning from the EAC elite will be divisive in driving vote choice. On the contrary, if voters are politically dissatisfied and angered by widespread instability, protest votes directed at national administrations may be more credible. Further research on this topic in the East African context would be revealing.
Conclusion
Military concerns are integral to an investigation of support for regional integration initiatives. This analysis demonstrates that a citizen's attitude with regards a joint military force has paramount explanatory value in a very different developing context (the EAC) relative to the developed context (the EU) in which this theoretical interpretation was first generated. This central finding has specific implications for the future of integration in the East African region.
Peace and security concerns are at the forefront of EAC discussions -the EAC elite will need to assuage citizens with military concerns if the EAF is to be a legitimate and truly 'peopledriven' project. Further, it prompts the exploration of regional integration attitudes elsewhere in Africa (and the world) through EU-generated opinion formation interpretations. 
